'  &-YW 

a. 

THE  RUSSIAN 
FAMINES 

1922-1923 


Excerpts  from  the  Official  Report  of  the 
Investigating  Commission  sent  to  Russia 
by  the  National  Information  Bureau,  at 
the  request  of  the  major  American  relief 
organizations,  to  discover  the  facts  about 
the  Russian  famine  and  American  relief. 


Issued  by 

National  Headquarters 

RUSSIAN  FAMINE  FUND 


15  PARK  ROW 
NEW  YORK 


Excerpts  from  the  Official  Report 
of  the  National  Information  Bureau 

ON 

THE  RUSSIAN  FAMINES 


A  FAIR  estimate  of  the  number  of  people  in  Russia  who  will  starve 
before  August,  1923,  if  not  fed  by  Russian  or  foreign  relief,  is 
8,000,000.  At  the  peak  of  the  need  next  summer  ten  million  people 
may  perhaps  be  involved. 

*  *  * 

Put  in  the  briefest  possible  way,  the  situation  which  we  found 
in  Russia  is  this :  The  greater  part  of  the  twenty-two  million  who  were 
hungry  in  1921-22  either  sowed  for  the  1922  harvest  much  less  than 
the  year  before  or  sowed  no  crops  at  all,  so  that  at  best,  for  Russia 
as  a  whole,  a  considerable  shortage  as  compared  with  a  normal  crop 
was  to  be  expected  this  year.  Then  a  series  of  local  disasters — 
drought  and  a  variety  of  pests — cut  so  deeply  into  this  year’s  harvest 
that  over  a  considerable  part  of  last  year’s  hunger  area  a  new  famine 
is  undeniably  the  result. 

*  *  * 

We  found  many  indications  of  this  new  famine.  The  flight  of 
hungry  peasants  from  their  farms  to  seek  food  in  the  cities  had 
begun  again  in  eastern  Russia  and  southern  Ukraine  as  early  as 
October,  two  months  after  the  harvest.  Ten  deaths  from  starvation 
in  the  space  of  a  few  days  in  October  were  reported  in  a  single 
volost.  At  the  other  end  of  the  famine  belt,  the  people  we  talked 
with  seemed  more  concerned  about  the  lack  of  weeds  than  the  lack  of 
real  food.  They  ate  the  weeds  so  closely  last  year  that  too  few  were 
left  to  make  a  crop.  Relief  workers  themselves,  in  November,  1922, 
were  eating  bread  made  of  pigweed  seed,  and  little  else. 

*  *  * 

We  have  taken  the  early  crop  reports  into  careful  consideration, 
but  after  inspecting  the  famine  areas  and  analyzing  later  crop  figures 
we  have  been  forced  to  the  conclusion  that  the  outlook  for  the  present 
Winter  and  coming  Spring  is  far  worse  than  it  appeared  in  early 
Summer. 

*  *  * 

Everywhere  we  went  in  Russia  we  found  an  effort  being  made  to 
care  for  homeless  children,  but  everywhere  the  problem  was  too  much 


for  local  resources.  In  the  city  of  Ekaterinburg  over  10,000  orphans 
were  already  under  care,  and  the  Commissar  of  Health  told  us  in 
November  that  never  a  day  passed  without  his  finding  a  baby  or 
child  or  two  left  behind  the  door  or  in  the  hallway  of  his  office  by 
starving  mothers  who  knew  they  could  not  keep  their  children  alive. 

Fuel  and  clothing  were  lacking  in  every  receiving  home  which 
we  saw.  The  children  had  no  more  than  a  single  cotton  garment 
apiece.  They  huddled  around  the  fire  except  at  meal-times,  when 
they  were  hurried  into  the  coldest  of  the  rooms,  where  half  the 
windows  had  no  panes.  They  were  apparently  too  miserable  even 
to  cry. 

Since  children  were  fed  long  before  adults  in  the  starvation  dis¬ 
tricts,  and  child-feeding  has  been  more  consistently  done,  children 
have  been  kept  alive  while  their  parents  have  died,  and  the  number 
of  orphans  has  thus  increased. 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  policy  of  feeding  children  only, 
in  districts  where  starvation  is  general,  adds  heavily  to  the  number 
of  orphans  and — in  view  of  the  present  deficiencies  of  institutional 
care — is  a  doubtful  service  to  the  children  who  survive. 

*  *  * 

In  Russia  as  in  any  other  country  with  a  demoralized  economic 
life  and  a  depreciated  currency  the  professional  classes  and  students 
are  in  serious  plight.  We  found  the  universities  and  schools  crowded, 
but  everywhere  there  was  evidence  that  at  least  70  per  cent  of  the 
teaching  staffs  and  60  to  80  per  cent  of  the  students  were  so  seriously 
undernourished  and  insufficiently  clothed  as  to  jeopardize  their  health. 

In  the  face  of  great  hardship — students  in  rags  are  sleeping  on  the 
floors  of  entirely  unfurnished  buildings  set  aside  for  their  use  in 
Moscow,  with  barely  enough  food  and  fuel  to  keep  alive — the  attend¬ 
ance  at  Russian  universities  increased  from  1 34,000  in  192 1  to  1 70,000 
in  1922.  So  many  were  without  food  last  Fall  that  those  being  fed 
voluntarily  reduced  their  single  meal  from  1,600  to  1,200  calories  so 
that  a  thousand  more  might  share  the  smaller  ration. 

If  Russia’s  best  potential  leadership  is  to  be  conserved  the  students 
and  professional  classes  will  need  help  for  a  considerable  time  to  come. 

*  *  * 

It  is  impossible  to  find  any  single  cause  which  fully  explains  the 
famines  of  1921-22  and  1922-23.  Russian  agriculture  has  been  slow 
to  develop.  For  half  a  century  after  the  emancipation  of  the  serfs 
in  1861  the  cultivated  area  hardly  increased,  though  the  population 
multiplied  two  and  a  half  times.  Peasant  farming  was  generally  of 


a  low  order.  Wasteful  methods  were  common.  Particularly  in  the 
region  of  the  Volga,  the  abundance  of  land  suitable  for  cultivation 
and  the  large  profits  in  favorable  years  encouraged  a  very  unstable 
and  inefficient  type  of  cultivation.  It  was  customary  in  some  parts 
of  the  valley  to  hold  reserves  for  at  least  two  years  against  the  possi¬ 
bility  of  crop  failure.  Such  failures  have  been  frequent;  they  gave 
rise  to  serious  famines  in  1891,  1892,  1898,  and  1911. 

*  *  * 

From  the  Great  War  onward  a  number  of  factors  contributed  to 
an  increasing  disorganization  and  curtailment  of  production.  Seven¬ 
teen  million  men  and  two  million  horses  were  mobilized  in  the  three 
years  19 14-17.  The  loss  of  workers  and  horses  tended  directly  to 
reduce  the  crops ;  the  break-down  of  the  Russian  railways  under  the 
strain  of  war  transportation  contributed  indirectly  to  the  same  result, 
because  it  became  difficult  to  market  the  surplus.  The  peasants  be¬ 
gan  to  sow  less  land,  and  the  large  estates  worked  by  hired  labor 
suffered  still  more  severely.  If  grain  could  not  be  shipped  out,  neither 
could  agricultural  machinery  be  brought  in ;  imports  of  this  sort  fell 
from  95,200  metric  tons  in  1914  to  only  4,100  in  1915.  The  supply 
within  Russia  fell  gradually  into  disrepair. 

*  *  * 

Then  came  the  years  of  civil  war.  The  Kerensky  government 
turned  to  the  herds  of  the  Volga  Valley,  as  the  Tsar  had  done,  to 
supply  the  army.  The  Bolsheviks  made  further  drains.  The  Czecho¬ 
slovaks  drove  them  out,  and  requisitioned  for  themselves.  Back 
swept  the  Bolsheviks,  only  to  be  driven  out  once  more  by  Kolchak. 
Finally  the  Red  Army,  battling  successively  against  Denikin, 
Wrangel,  Yudenitch  and  the  Poles,  turned  once  more  to  the  Volga 
for  supplies.  It  was  a  Sherman’s  march  to  the  sea  spread  over  seven 
years.  Of  the  23  districts  listed  by  the  government  as  famine  areas  in 
192 1 ,  at  least  1 5  had  been  at  some  time  or  other  the  scene  of  military 
operations. 

*  *  * 

To  the  effects  of  war  must  be  added  sweeping  economic  changes. 
Very  generally  the  large  land  holdings  were  broken  up  and  divided 
among  the  peasants.  Since  the  large  estates  had  always  been  more 
productive,  proportionately,  than  the  peasant  farms,  this  in  itself 
tended  to  reduce  production. 

The  Soviet  government  assumed  a  monopoly  of  internal  and 
external  trade  in  grain,  forbade  the  use  of  hired  labor,  and  made  the 
entire  cropoftheindividual  farmer  state  property,  subject  to  requisition 


in  full,  except  for  an  allowance  fixed  by  the  government  for  his  own 
food  and  seed  requirements.  In  some  cases  the  reserves  accumulated 
from  former  harvests,  and  held  as  insurance  against  bad  years,  were 
confiscated  outright.  These  requisitions  were  a  great  discouragement 
to  production.  Meanwhile  it  became  impossible  for  the  peasant  to 
buy  in  the  cities  the  goods  for  which  he  was  accustomed  to  exchange 
his  grain.  His  markets,  both  domestic  and  foreign,  had  disappeared. 
He  could  not  even  barter  his  surplus  for  tools.  He  gained  nothing 
by  raising  more  than  he  needed  for  his  family,  his  livestock,  and  seed¬ 
ing;  and  there  he  drew  the  line.  Presently  there  was  no  surplus. 

By  1920  these  processes  had  reached  the  point  where  local  short¬ 
ages  produced  actual  starvation. 

*  *  * 

Then  came  the  drought  of  1921.  Instead  of  the  normal  14  inches 
of  rain  between  October  and  July  the  middle  and  lower  Volga  had  2 
inches.  The  rains  of  May  and  J une,  on  which  the  crop  depends,  failed 
altogether.  In  twenty  provinces  the  total  yield  was  barely  more  than 
one  seventh  of  its  pre-war  amount. 

An  important  element  in  this  situation  was  the  practical  extinction 
of  work  animals  in  parts  of  the  famine  area  and  heavy  losses  through¬ 
out  it.  Lacking  fodder  to  feed  them  the  peasants  killed  and  ate  them, 
or  sold  them  to  buy  food.  The  decrease  led  to  a  further  reduction 
in  the  area  sown.  Almost  everywhere  plowing  was  superficial ;  much 
was  done  by  hand. 

While  in  some  cases  there  were  too  few  animals  to  permit  of  sowing 
the  available  seed,  in  others  the  lack  of  seed  at  the  normal  time  of 
planting,  the  attempt  to  sow  seed  from  other  parts  of  Russia  which 
was  not  adapted  to  the  local  climate,  and  the  late  arrival  of  seed 
supplied  through  foreign  or  governmental  efforts,  accounted  for  a 
diminishing  crop  in  1922. 

*  *  * 

In  round  numbers,  14,000,000  people  were  fed  by  Russian  or 
foreign  relief  agencies  at  some  time  between  the  harvest  of  1921  and 
that  of  1922.  The  relief  thus  given  affected  many  more  than  those 
actually  fed,  for  if  part  of  a  starving  population  is  fed,  large  numbers 
in  addition  will  be  kept  alive  by  the  local  stocks  thus  released  for  their 
sole  use.  The  original  plan  was  to  feed  a  supplementary  ration  to 
1 ,000,000  children.  American  workers  found  the  need  so  great  that 
adult  feeding  was  agreed  upon.  Both  child  and  adult  programs  were 
rapidly  expanded  until  at  their  peak  4,171,441  children  and  6,257,958 
adults  were  being  fed  in  twenty-four  provinces,  the  entire  Ukraine 
and  the  cities  of  Petrograd  and  Moscow. 


The  entire  distribution  was  supported  by  approximately  the 
following  funds,  subsequently  increased  to  carry  relief  operations 
into  1923: 


A.  R.  A.  funds .  $7,000,000 

Congressional  Authorization .  19,300,000 

Congressional  Authorization  of  Army  Medical  Supplies .  4,000,000 

American  Red  Cross  Medical  Supplies .  3 ,600,000 

American  J ewish  J oint  Distribution  Committee .  4,325 ,000 

Laura  Spelman  Rockefeller  Memorial .  500,000 

A.  R.  A.  Food  Remittances .  6,000,000 

Volga  Relief  Society .  200,000 

Mennonite  Central  Committee .  252,000 

National  Catholic  Welfare  Council .  100,000 

Southern  Baptists .  1 20,000 

International  Committee  of  Y.  M.  C.  A .  '  50,000 

Federal  Council  of  the  Churches  of  Christ  in  America  . .  90,000 

Soviet  Gold  and  credits .  1 1 ,43  3 ,000 

National  Lutheran  Council .  300,000 

Food  purchased  by  American  Friends  (Quakers)  for  its 
own  distribution .  41 5 ,000 


Total .  $57,685,000 


The  Soviet  government  appropriated  the  gold  and  credits  above 
mentioned  for  the  purchase  of  seed  corn  in  the  United  States  for  use 
in  its  seed  loan  program. 

*  *  * 

The  American  Friends  Service  Committee,  which  had  previously 
been  maintaining  a  small  local  work  in  Moscow,  participated  with 
the  American  Relief  Administration  in  the  agreement  with  the  Soviet 
government  and  recommenced  relief  in  the  eastern  section  of  Buzuluk 
county  in  Samara,  where  it  had  done  refugee  work  during  the  war. 
Here  it  fed  up  to  a  maximum  of  65,086  children  and  76,605  adults. 
In  addition  it  gave  15,000  children  in  Minsk  milk  rations. 

*  *  * 

a 

The  famines  of  1921-22  and  1922-23  can  be  explained  roughly 
as  the  result  of  serious  crop  failures  occurring  on  a  sown  area  too 
small  for  a  margin  of  safety,  at  a  time  when  the  peasants  were  without 
reserves.  The  immediate  problem  is  therefore  to  enable  the  peasant 
to  sow  a  sufficient  area,  properly  tilled,  to  provide  a  safe  surplus 
against  local  shortages.  Beyond  this  problem  lies  a  greater  one — 
to  increase  the  surplus  to  a  point  where  it  affords  a  firm  foundation 
for  the  economic  life  of  Russia,  and  to  provide  adequate  facilities 
for  crop  distribution. 


We  cannot  pass  over  in  silence  the  enormous  achievement  of 
these  American  organizations  and  their  workers  in  Russia,  who  sur¬ 
mounted  difficulties  of  which  the  reader  can  have  no  conception,  and 
carried  through  a  task  of  organization,  transportation  and  distribution 
quite  without  precedent  in  the  history  of  relief.  The  devotion  of 
these  Americans  in  the  discharge  of  their  difficult  duties,  amid  scenes 
much  more  terrible  and  depressing  even  than  the  gruesome  sights  of 
war — as  many  who  lived  through  both  have  testified — is  a  page  in  the 
history  of  service  of  which  this  country  may  well  be  proud.  We  found 
evidences  everywhere  that  these  efforts  have  made  a  deep  and  lasting 
impression  upon  the  Russian  people  as  a  whole,  and  have  aroused  a 
gratitude  which  will  not  die. 

*  *  * 

The  most  important  step  in  removing  the  causes  of  famine  has 
already  been  taken  by  the  Soviet  Government.  The  adoption  of  the 
new  economic  policy  in  1921  did  away  with  the  wholesale  requisitions 
which  were  a  powerful  deterrent  to  production.  So  far  as  we  ob¬ 
served,  the  grain  tax  of  1922  permitted  the  peasants  to  accumulate 
a  surplus  for  the  market  and  to  dispose  of  it  as  they  pleased.  Normal 
economic  motives  may  now  be  expected  to  increase  the  crop  area 
substantially.  But  without  draft  animals  the  peasant  cannot  increase 
the  sown  area  even  if  he  wishes  to.  At  the  outside  there  are  not 
more  than  25  per  cent  of  the  normal  number  in  the  famine  districts. 
There  is  a  vicious  circle  here:  without  animals  the  peasants  cannot 
sow  adequate  crops ;  without  crop  surpluses  they  cannot  buy  animals. 

*  *  * 

The  announced  intention  of  the  Soviet  Government  to  export 
grain  is  a  further  complication  in  the  foreign  relief  situation.  Though 
making  frequent  inquiries  while  in  Russia  we  learned  of  no  exporta¬ 
tion  up  to  the  time  of  our  departure.  Our  only  knowledge  of  actual 
exports  is  from  reports  since  our  return  indicating  that  small  amounts 
have  been  sent  into  Finland  and  that  considerable  quantities  have 
been  stored  at  Petrograd  and  in  the  south,  presumably  for  shipment. 
Our  information  is  that  only  a  small  part  of  these  stocks  is  actually 
Soviet  property  and  so  available  to  the  government,  without  purchase, 
for  feeding  the  hungry. 

The  wisdom  of  shipping  grain  out  of  the  country,  for  any  reason, 
while  foreign  generosity  sends  other  grain  in  to  keep  Russians  alive 
is  certainly  debatable.  We  have  no  means  of  knowing  whether  there 
will  actually  be  any  considerable  amounts  available  for  export.  The 
estimates  vary  from  fifteen  to  fifty  million  dollars. 


The  position  of  the  Soviet  Government  regarding  exports  is  that 
they  are  imperatively  necessary  to  break  the  vicious  circle  already  re¬ 
ferred  to — underproduction  because  of  the  lack  of  horses  and  plows, 
new  shortages,  famine,  further  killing  and  eating  of  horses,  continued 
underproduction.  Quite  frankly  the  authorities  state  that  even  at  the 
cost  of  many  deaths  from  starvation  this  year,  exporting  grain  is  the 
only  way  to  secure  the  work  animals  and  implements  needed  to  pre¬ 
vent  many  more  deaths  in  the  future. 

*  *  * 

a 

The  emergency  in  Russia  is  not  over.  To  the  extent  that  peasants 
who  were  kept  alive  last  year  through  American  aid  are  left  to  die  in 
1923,  America’s  effort  is  inadequate.  Emergency  aid  and  the  restora¬ 
tion  of  agriculture  are  both  necessary.  The  Soviet  Government  has 
proved  its  incapacity  to  provide  both.  Relief  agencies  cannot  rebuild 
Russian  agriculture;  the  Russian  Government  has  begun  to  do  so, 
and  for  the  reasons  already  stated  we  believe  the  outlook  for  recovery 
to  be  promising.  If  the  government  really  undertook  to  exchange 
grain  for  tools  and  horses,  and  thereby  contributed  to  the  rebuilding 
of  peasant  farms,  we  are  not  prepared  to  say  that  the  policy  would 
be  unsound.  The  logic  of  the  situation  points  to  continued  aid  from 
outside  Russia  until  the  emergency  is  over. 

In  any  case,  American  aid  has  not  hitherto  been  conditioned  on 
approval  of  the  Soviet’s  economic  or  political  policies.  It  has  been 
given,  in  fact,  in  the  face  of  almost  universal  disapproval  of  Soviet 
policy,  because  of  the  wish  to  meet  a  demonstrated  human  need. 

*  *  * 

In  our  judgment  the  facts  we  observed  in  Russia  point  inescapably 
to  the  conclusion  that  if  widespread  suffering  and  death  from  star¬ 
vation  this  year  are  to  be  prevented,  American  help  must  be  con¬ 
tinued  on  a  large  scale. 

Commission  on  Russian  Relief 

ALLEN  WARDWELL, 

Formerly  American  Red  Cross  Commissioner  to  Russia,  1917. 

GRAHAM  R.  TAYLOR, 

Formerly  Assistant  to  American  Ambassador  to  Russia,  1917. 

ALLEN  T.  BURNS, 

Director,  National  Information  Bureau . 


